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Abstract
It is difficult to explain the price insensitive or infra-marginal behavior, an example of 
which is the behavior of credit markets during the recent financial crisis, by risk aversion 
alone. It is known that infra-marginal behavior may arise with ambiguity aversion. 
Furthermore, there appears to be fairly strong evidence of a close connection between 
ambiguity and conformity. Here we propose an extension of the standard ambiguity 
framework to incorporate conformity. We find that there are open sets of state-price 
ratios over which the entire market is price insensitive or infra-marginal. This result has 
important implications for market equilibrium and volatility.
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1Ambiguity, Market Prices, and Infra-Marginal Behavior
A salient feature of the 2008 global financial crisis is freezing up of the credit 
markets. The problem is not the price of credit; rather, it’s the lack of availability of 
credit that caused the crisis implying that at least a large segment of the credit market 
became infra-marginal or price insensitive. That is, changes in the price of credit did not 
induce participation. It is well known that with expected utility maximization, infra-
marginality is a knife-edge condition and there are no open sets of state price ratios in 
which agents remain infra-marginal or price insensitive. It seems that expected utility 
maximization may not be sufficient to understand infra-marginal behavior.
As argued by Knight (1921), Keynes (1936) and others, and as motivated by the 
famous Ellsberg paradox in Ellsberg (1961), agents appear to distinguish between risk 
(outcomes with known probabilities) and ambiguity (outcomes with unknown 
probabilities). In particular, Ellsberg (1961) and later experimental replications clearly 
demonstrate that agents display aversion to ambiguity.
Due to strong experimental and anecdotal evidence of ambiguity aversion, 
economics literature has started to explore its implications recently. Notable contributions 
are Epstein and Wang (1994), Maenhout (2000), Cagetti, Hansen, Sargent and Williams 
(2002), Uppal and Wang (2003), Skiadas (2005), Trojani, Leippold, and Vanini (2005), 
and Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarneschelli, and Zame (2007). In particular, Bossaerts et al 
(2007) use the “ minmax ” model of Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) 
to show that infra-marginal responses with interesting implications arise with ambiguity 
aversion.  
In contrast, psychology literature offers undeniable evidence of a strong link 
between ambiguity and conformity. There is clear evidence that when individuals do not 
know how to respond, they look to other people, observe how they behave, and mimic 
their behavior. Notable examples from this literature are Sherif (1936), Deutsch and 
Gerard (1955), Asch (1956), Allen and Wilder (1977), Bandura (1986), Turner (1991), 
and Cialdini and Trost (1998). 
2How do we reconcile ambiguity with conformity? More importantly, how does 
the interaction between ambiguity and conformity affect infra-marginality? What are the 
implications for market equilibrium? In this paper, we make an initial tentative attempt at 
providing answers to these questions. We accomplish this by extending the 
minmax framework of Ghirardato et al (2004) to incorporate conformity. Our main 
finding is that in a market comprising of ambiguity averse agents of all types and of 
ambiguity neutral agents, there are open sets of state price ratios in which the entire 
market is infra-marginal or price insensitive. This is in contrast with Bossaerts et al 
(2007) where, for state-price ratios different than one, there are always some ambiguity 
averse agents who remain marginal.
The above finding has stark implications. If aggregate wealth differs across states 
then there are open sets of state price ratios that cannot support any market equilibrium 
with ambiguity averse agents. In order to find equilibrium, prices must jump over such 
intervals. Implications for volatility are immediately seen.
The Model
Consider a market over one time period marked by two points in time; time 0 and 
time1. All trade takes place at time 0 and all consumption takes place at time 1. There is
only one consumption good. There are three states of nature; state 1, state 2, and state 3. 
Any one of these states may be realized at time 1 so uncertainty is only about time 1. At 
time 0, each agent is endowed with a risk-less security and Arrow securities. The Arrow
securities are of three types corresponding to the three states; type 1, type 2, and type 3.  
They pay exactly one unit of consumption good in corresponding states at time 1 and 
nothing otherwise. That is, type 1 pays 1 unit if state 1 is realized and nothing otherwise. 
Similarly, types 2 and 3 pay 1 unit if states 2 and 3 are realized respectively and nothing 
otherwise.
Denote the price vector of Arrow securities by ),,( 321 pppp  . Normalize so that 
the price of the risk-less security is 1. It follows from the no arbitrage condition that
31321  ppp . Since it’s a three-state, three security model, we can conveniently take 
the market to be complete (an Arrow-Debreu market which is complete), so the risk-less 
asset is redundant.
Here we consider three different frameworks for individual choice in the setting 
described above; the expected utility framework, the ambiguity attitudes framework of 
Ghirardato et al (2004), and an extension of Ghirardato et al (2004) framework to 
incorporate conformity. 
The most familiar individual choice framework is expected utility maximization. 
In that framework, given the state probabilities 2121 1,,   , and the budget 
constraint, each individual makes demand choices so as to maximize the expected utility 
of wealth given by 
)()1()()()( 3212211 wUwUwUwU   (1)
where (.)U  is assumed to be twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave.
In contrast, Ghirardato et al (2004) propose a framework for ambiguity attitudes. 
Suppose the probability of state 1 is known but the probabilities of states 2 and 3 are 
unknown. That is, agents face ambiguity regarding states 2 and 3. To deal with such a 
situation, Ghirardato et al (2004) propose the following framework. With (.)U being 
twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave, an agent maximizes,
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An agent’s pessimistic scenario is captured by the value of parameter   that minimizes 
expected utility over ambiguous states and his optimistic scenario is determined by the 
value of   that maximizes his expected utility over the ambiguous states. The parameter 
]1,0[  captures ambiguity attitudes. Extreme ambiguity aversion is captured by 1   
, extreme ambiguity loving is captured by 0 , and ambiguity neutrality is captured by 
.5.0  Bossaerts et al (2007) study the implications of this framework for infra-
4marginality. They show that there is an open set of state price ratios over which an agent 
is infra-marginal and prefers to hold an unambiguous portfolio.
As mentioned in the introduction, there appears to be a strong link between 
ambiguity and conformity. A large body of psychology literature confirms this link (see 
introduction for references). To our knowledge, this apparent link between ambiguity and 
conformity has not been modeled in economic literature. Here we take an initial tentative 
step in this direction and explore the implications of this link for economic behavior. We 
accomplish this by extending the Ghirardato et al (2004) framework as follows,
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(.)U  is assumed to be twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave.
(3) has two additional parameters when compared with (2); ]1,0[c  and ]1,0[ . They 
capture an agent’s confidence in his own judgment and average ambiguity attitude in the
environment respectively. The idea is that an agent is a social being and is connected to 
other agents through the media or otherwise and gets an idea about their attitudes 
regarding ambiguity and consequently gets influenced. An agent may not even be
consciously aware of these influences since such influences may operate subconsciously 
or implicitly. Different types of implicit environmental influences have been extensively 
documented in the psychology literature. See Forgas and Moylan (1987), Wells and Petty 
(1980), and Steele and Aronson (1995). 
When 1c , the framework in (3) reduces to the Ghiraradato et al (2004) 
framework and agent displays full confidence in his own judgment and does not conform. 
An agent is maximally conforming when 0c . When 50.0c , an agent gives equal 
weights to his own ambiguity attitude and the average ambiguity attitude in his 
environment. This framework is general enough to potentially capture a rich class of 
market behaviors, involving interplay between ambiguity and conformity. In this 
framework, verifiable implications of the psychology assertion that higher the perception 
5of ambiguity-stronger is the need to conform, can be derived and experimentally tested as 
negative correlations between cand .
The extended framework leads to a number of interesting results, which are 
discussed next.
Proposition 1 In an ambiguity averse environment, there is a non-empty set of state 
price ratios over which an agent, who is less ambiguity averse than the environment, 
prefers not to be exposed to ambiguity, provided his confidence falls below a certain 
threshold.
Proof. If 32 ww  , the minimum and maximum conditions in (3) are satisfied when 
0 and 11    respectively. So (3) becomes,
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The first order condition of optimality leads to,
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Similarly, if 23 ww  , we obtain,
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That is, if the price ratio is in the range defined by (8), then the agent prefers not be 
exposed to ambiguity (holds an unambiguous portfolio). The agent is infra-marginal or 
price insensitive over that range.
Given that the environment is ambiguity averse ( 50.0 ), and the agent is less 
ambiguity averse than the environment ( 0 ), (8) is a non-empty set if 
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▄
Corollary 1 If an agent is ambiguity neutral but the environment is ambiguity averse then 
there is always a non-empty set of state price ratios over which he prefers no to be 
exposed to ambiguity.
Corollary 2 Even if an agent is extremely ambiguity loving, there is a threshold 
confidence level below which he prefers not to be exposed to ambiguity.
Proposition 2 In a market where all types of ambiguity averse attitudes (including 
ambiguity neutrality) are uniformly present, there is a non-empty set of state price 
ratios over which the entire market is infra-marginal.
Proof.  Here ]1,5.0[ and 75.0 . Let L denote the lower limit of the set of state price 
ratios over which an agent of ambiguity attitude is infra-marginal and U denote the 
upper limit of the set. 
It is easy to see that 0&0 




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UL
, it follows that the highest value of L and the 
lowest value of U occur at .50.0
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▄
Corollary 1 Even if the market includes a significant fraction of ambiguity loving agents, 
apart from ambiguity averse and ambiguity neutral agents, there exists a non-empty set of 
state price ratios over which the entire market is infra-marginal.
Remark If there is no conformity, that is, only ambiguity is present, as in Ghirardato et al 
(2004) framework, marginal agents always exist for any state price ratio different than 1. 
Hence, the possibility of entire market being infra-marginal arises only due to the 
interaction between ambiguity and conformity.
Proposition 3 If aggregate wealths over ambiguous states are unequal, and all types of 
ambiguity averse attitudes (including ambiguity neutrality) are uniformly present in 
the market, there exists a non-empty set of state price ratios that cannot support any 
market equilibrium.
Proof.  It follows from proposition 2 that the entire market is infra-marginal for the set of
prices defined by (9). Market clearing requires that aggregate demands of state securities
equal their respective aggregate supplies. However, infra-marginal investors demand 
equal wealths in ambiguous states. Consequently, markets cannot clear for the set of state 
price ratios defined by (9) if aggregate wealths are different across ambiguous states.
▄
8Conclusion
We propose an extension of the framework in Ghirardato et al (2004) to incorporate 
conformity. The implications are explored for a three state – three security complete 
market world.  We find that there is a non-empty set of state price ratios for which the 
entire market, composed of ambiguity averse and ambiguity neutral agents, becomes 
infra-marginal or price insensitive. Hence, if aggregate wealths differ across states, then 
such a set cannot support market equilibrium. 
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